Lacking the Machinery: Colin McGinn. There are those who argue that people can never understand consciousness. The mystery is too deep. Colin McGinn, a philosopher from Rutgers University, argues that because our brains are products of evolution, they have cognitive limitations. Just as rats and monkeys cannot even conceive of quantum mechanics, humans may be prohibited from understanding certain aspects of existence, such as the relation between mind and matter.
He says that for humans to grasp how subjective experience arises from matter might be like "slugs trying to do Freudian psychoanalysis--they just don't have the conceptual equipment. Quantum Consciousness: Roger Penrose. One form of dualism involves the mysteries of quantum mechanics. Roger Penrose from the University of Oxford argues that consciousness is the link between the quantum world, in which a single object can exist in two places at the same time, and the so-called classical world of familiar objects where this cannot happen.
Speculation that quantum mechanics and consciousness are linked is based on the principle that the act of measurement--which ultimately involves a conscious observer--has an effect on quantum events. Moreover, with Stuart Hameroff of the University of Arizona, he has proposed a theory that the switch from quantum to classical states occurs inside certain proteins call microtubules.
The brain's microtubules, they argue, are ideally situated to perform this transformation, producing "occasions of experience" that with the flow of time give rise to stream of consciousness thought. The Hard Problem: David Chalmers. To explain this concept, David Chalmers, a philosopher at the University of California Santa Cruz, first describes the so-called easy problems of consciousness, the sorts of questions being tackled in neuroscience laboratories around the world: How does sensory information get integrated in the brain?
How do we see and reach out for an object? How are we able to verbalize our internal states and report what we are doing or feeling? Chalmers does not contend that these problems are trivial. He claims that they may take years to solve, but that progress is being made.
He phrases the hard problem as this: What is the nature of subjective experience? Why do we have vividly felt experiences of the world? Thus far, nothing in physics or chemistry or biology can explain these subjective feelings, Chalmers says. According to Chalmers, scientists need to come up with new fundamental laws of nature.
Physicists postulate that certain properties--gravity, space-time, electromagnetism- are basic to any understanding of the universe, he said. His approach is to think of conscious experience itself as a fundamental property of the universe. Thus the world has two kinds of information, one physical, one experiential.
The challenge is to make theoretical connections between physical processes and conscious experience. Semiconductor technology is advancing to the point where devices will have the complexity that is required to solve lower level perception tasks. The level of complexity required for higher cortical processing is still years away. This technology has made possible a new discipline--synthetic neurobiology.
The thesis of this discipline is that it is not possible, even in principle, to claim a full understanding of a system unless one is able to build one that functions properly. This principle is already well accepted in molecular biology and more recently in genetics. Because biological systems generate on very different principles than do conventional systems, the ability to synthesize models of biological function results in a new engineering discipline.
Systems using this new discipline have demonstrated real-time operation requiring far less power consumption than digital systems performing the same function. Silicon Brains and Computational Neuroengineering. Almost everyday, surprising discoveries about the organization and mechanisms of nervous systems are being reported. The VLSI revolution has provided computer science with unprecedented tools to transform what we know about the brain into silicon.
Silicon retinas and cochleas have already been designed and manufactured. Although it is nearly impossible to predict future technological breakthroughs, ever more sophisticated neuroengineering is in the offing. Neural networks, composed of silicon neurons, could be used to emulate intelligent circuits in the brain. These simulations could be used to investigate mechanisms of learning, memory, and cognition, and perhaps consciousness.
Some scientists speculate that consciousness is some combination of short-term memory and attention, two neural processes that could conceivably be modeled by silicon networks. If scientists could simulate artificial consciousness not to be confused with artificial intelligence , perhaps they can observe it, if not understand it. Computational neuroscience is the study of how the brain represents and the world and how it computes.
Such effects include segregating a figure from its background and recognizing an object from different angles. Neuroscience contributes three main ingredients to this effort: anatomical parameters, physiological parameters, and clues to the function of the human biological neural network and its computational mode of operation in executing that function.
Neural networks provide neurobiologists with a working model of the nervous system. This type of collaboration between computer modeling and neuroscience with insights into mixed modality, multiplexing, and understanding attention selectivity.
Silicon Neurons. Neurons in the living body have electrical and chemical mechanisms that let them act together to represent and respond to behaviorally significant physical events. Over time, neurons have learned to manipulate how their membrane conducts various ions to produce electrical events that form a basis for computation.
Neuroscientists are learning about neural computation through reverse engineering. Fortunately, the physical properties of analog CMOS are similar to those governing the electrical behavior of neurons and neural systems; therefore, analog CMOS is a convenient medium for building neuromorphic systems. The silicon neuron can emulate the behavior of any particular neuron in the nervous system simply by setting several parameters. Most of the cutting edge work on silicon neurons has been done in the lab of Rodney Douglas and Misha Mahowald.
People with online papers in philosophy Compiled by David Chalmers and another listing here. Is consciousness something that is unique to organic life forms? BRAIN as the basis for morality. Even though the robotic concept - as of androids - is considerably new, ideas on the development of robots and automata can be dated back to the 13 th century.
Are we safe? Can they turn against humans? On the following videos, we can find endless examples of the achievements of robotics, with Robots that replicate human expressions and facial characteristics perfectly and also the many different and sometimes very controversial purposes to which they are used. III — Artificial Intelligence AI is the field of robotics that focuses on the development of intelligent machines that can process thoughts, understand human thinking and mimic it.
Consciousness is a widely studied topic in psychology and there are no standard modes of how to measure it, or define exactly what consciousness is. Therefore, when it comes to the possibility of having it simulated in AI, much is argued and discussed.
What is consciousness and where does it come from? Is it a product of the many electrical a neuronal activities on the brain?
Is conscience the brain, or the mind? And are these two last words really two separate entities? Many studies argue that, being consciousness a product of coordinated activities that occur in the human being, it is possible then to replicate these activities in an artificial intelligence model, therefore giving machine the ability to develop a conscious state.
Artificial Intelligence and Human Morality Do androids deserve human rights? What if consciousness is a property that emerges from complex systems that process information and can and do monitor themselves as feedback?
What if humans build androids that appear to manifest consciousness? Would it be morally acceptable to unplug them or destroy them? The video shows a robotic female being assembled and having her functions described. She states that she doesn't need to be fed; her battery lasts for years, she can take care of kids, clean a house, and is available as a sexual partner. After prompting by the unseen "Operator," she speaks fluently in French and German, before singing in Japanese. Once the Operator has heard enough, he states that she's ready to be sold.
Initially confused about this statement, she quickly realizes she's a piece of merchandise. You can't kill me yet. Stop this, please stop! I'm scared! Sonny displays very unrobotlike but very human like behavior. Machine Consciousness - Kask MP2. This video looks at the possibility of machines developing a true form of consciousness.
It takes a brief look at the developments in artificial intelligence, starting with early expert systems, then artificial general intelligence, and finally examines where AI is headed.
What is consciousness? Do we have consciousness because we are aware of it or are we aware of things because we possess consciousness? Why does it exist and, most importantly, how? Materialists cannot accept that consciousness is a thing that exists as as non-physical entity. Then how to explain what does not appear to have characteristics as do physical objects and forces? Here is one idea. Water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen. We know that this molecule manifests itself in different states according to its temperature or heat or speed of the molecules of water.
It can manifest as a liquid , solid or gas. Depending on its state or temperature it has different qualities. As water it is liquid. The liquidity of water manifests from the the molecules and their motion. Now think of the human brain as manifesting consciousness as H2O manifests liquidity under certain circumstances. For materialists there are no non-physical things, non-physical events or non-physical forces or any non-physical entities of any sort. Consciousness is a feature or quality of a physical entity brain or sate of that entity.
Consciousness manifests itself or emerges form brain activity. Consciousness is the the brain as liquidity is to H2O. If consciousness is a material thing or quality of a material thing then could it manifest with material things other than a human brain?
Could it manifest from another physical thing that is as complex as a human brain and functioning in a manner similar to a human brain? The answers to all these questions are constantly debated in Philosophy, especially in Philosophy of Mind.
When it comes to Robotics and the expansion of technology towards AI, these arguments focus onto the consequences and the treatment of the new perspectives humans would face if technology reaches the ability to produce robots that can develop consciousness. Some of the questions brought to awareness are of how would conscious Androids be treated?
Are they entitled to Human Rights, since they would possess, even if artificially, the same properties as human beings — feelings, awareness, consciousness, emotions?
Amongst the population, the idea of co-existing with conscious Androids brings not only questions and concerns, but also fears. But what are we really afraid of? Are we afraid that they might become dangerous? Or is it that we are not prepared to realize that humans may not be the last degree in the evolutionary scale we were always so proud and safe to dominate? David Chalmers — On Emergence. Consciousness, in his opinion, is an example of Strong Emergence, and we are only aware of it because we experience it.
To know more about David Chalmers, access his personal website. In the following videos, Vinge explains more about the concept of singularity. Vernor Vinge on Singularity — Part 1. Vernor Vinge on Singularity — Part 2. Singularity is the idea that machines could have the capacity to evolve at a faster pace than humans and is linked to the fear of robots gaining too much control.
In Philip K. The test for detecting them- Voight Kampf Test- and distinguishing them from humans is quite complicated and the results not always dependable. A test result indicates the replicant is unaware it is a replicant and appears to have feelings. This presentation presents the views on the possibilities and consequences of future machine rebellion against humanity.
Mark Bishop — Seminar Part 1. Mark Bishop — Seminar Part 2. Proceed to next section. Introduction to Philosophy by Philip A. Return to: Table of Contents for the Online Textbook. Chapter 6 : The Mind-Body Problem. In all these cases, it seems that part is prior to whole. For example, Bennett 8—9 offers an initial survey of building relations, and takes her leading example to be that of the composition of wholes from their parts.
Yet on the other hand consider some gerrymandered division of a circle. Here it seems that the circle is prior—the gerrymander is just an arbitrary partition on the circle. Or consider the organs of the body. Here it seems that the body is prior—the organs are just functional portions of the body. Or consider the myriad details of the percept.
Here it seems that the percept is prior—the details are just particulars of the gestalt. In these latter cases, it seems that whole is prior to part. Generalizing, it seems that commonsense actually has a relatively nuanced stance on priority relations between whole and part.
Commonsense endorses the priority of the parts in cases of mere aggregation and arrangement, and the priority of the whole in cases of arbitrary decompositions, functionally integrated systems, and mental unities.
On this point Aristotle Meta. So it remains, in evaluating 8, to ask whether commonsense conceives of the world as a mere heap or a genuine unity. Here the priority monist might invoke the following passage from Blanshard :. Our conviction is essentially that of the plain man. Indeed, as James []: notes in the course of defending pluralism—which he took to be a radical doctrine—virtually all pre-twentieth century philosophers have conceived of the world as a genuine unity:.
Whether materialistically or spiritually minded, philosophers have always aimed at cleaning up the litter with which the world apparently is filled. They have substituted economical and orderly conceptions for the first sensible tangle; and whether these were morally elevated or only intellectually neat, they were at any rate always aesthetically pure and definite, and aimed at ascribing to the world something clean and intellectual in the way of inner structure.
So the priority monist should conclude that, if anything, the argument from commonsense should be reversed. Commonsense does see the cosmos as more of a genuine unity than a mere heap more like a syllable than a heap of sand. One more passage from James []: 59 may be useful in mapping the general intellectual landscape, beyond the provinces of the twentieth century Anglo-American tradition:. A certain abstract monism, a certain emotional response to the character of oneness, as if it were a feature of the world not coordinate with its manyness, but vastly more excellent and eminent, is so prevalent in educated circles that we might almost call it part of philosophic common sense.
In any case, as to 9, it is not obvious that commonsense is entitled to much of an opinion on the topic. One might well think that the use of intuitions is particularly perilous on this topic in contrast to the more mundane topic of existence pluralism since the notion of ontological priority is a somewhat sophisticated theoretical notion.
I would suggest that even if commonsense leans slightly towards priority monism as the overall history of metaphysics might be thought to bear out , this should not matter much. To the extent it provides any reason to favor priority monism, it seems to be a rather weak reason.
This argument, which is an argument for priority monism by way of quantum mechanics, may be posed as follows:. The argument is obviously valid, so the only remaining questions concern the truth of the premises 11 and As to 11, the intended notion of an emergent property is one for which mereological supervenience fails. Such a property would be an intrinsic property of the whole that is not determined by the intrinsic properties of and spatiotemporal relations among its parts.
While any appeal to quantum mechanics sparks interpretive controversies, it seems that emergent properties are found in the entangled systems of quantum mechanics. An entangled system is one whose state vector is not factorizable into tensor products of the state vectors of its components:.
What this inequality means is that the quantum state of an entangled system contains information over and above that of the quantum states of the components. The intrinsic properties of entangled whole systems do not supervene on the intrinsic properties of and spatiotemporal relations among their component parts. Here Esfeld 26 notes:.
In the case of entanglement, it is only the description of the whole in terms of a pure state, such as the singlet state, which completely determines the local properties of the parts and their relations… Therefore, quantum physics exhibits a substantial holism.
The physical state of a complex whole cannot always be reduced to those of its parts, or to those of its parts together with their spatiotemporal relations, even when the parts inhabit distinct regions of space… The result of the most intensive scientific investigations in history is a theory that contains an ineliminable holism.
Entangled systems are wholes that contain new information, found in the correlation coefficients of their wave functions. There is reason to think that the world forms a single entangled system, due to the fact that everything interacted in the Big Bang. Everything is a shard of the primordial atom. As Gribbin explains:. Particles that were together in an interaction remain in some sense parts of a single system, which responds together to further interactions.
Virtually everything we see and touch and feel is made up of collections of particles that have been involved in interactions with other particles right back through time, to the Big Bang… Indeed, the particles that make up my body once jostled in close proximity and interacted with the particles that now make up your body. We are as much parts of a single system as the two photons flying out of the heart of the Aspect experiment. Though of course the claim that the world forms a single entangled system will be controversial as will any claim that involves an interpretation of quantum mechanics , in at least two respects.
First, certain kinds of anti-realist and relationalist interpretations of quantum mechanics e. Secondly, some interpretations e. I think that the best line for the priority pluralist to take is to deny 11, by holding that i entanglement represents a new fundamental relation between individual particles as opposed to a new emergent property of whole systems , and ii mereological supervenience should be revised to concern the supervenience of the intrinsic properties of wholes on the intrinsic properties of their parts plus any fundamental as opposed to merely spatiotemporal relations among their parts.
Entangled quantum systems so understood will now count as mereologically supervenient so understood. It is not true, then, that all else supervenes on anything less than the intrinsic properties of the whole system.
The n-place relations instantiated by the members of an n-party system are going to have to go into the supervenience basis. This is problematic in two respects, the first of which is that it marks an unprecedented departure from more localist pictures.
This seems like a loss of unity. Thus Calosi shows that one can treat e. This is problematic insofar as it posits fundamental entanglement relations relating entities that by the lights of the pluralist are nonfundamental. As Toraldo di Francia 28 aptly summarizes:. Since any particle has certainly interacted with other particles in the past, the world turns out to be nonseparable into individual and independent objects.
The world is in some way a single object. If nonlocality is a property of the entire universe, then we must also conclude that an undivided wholeness exists on the most basic and primary level in all aspects of physical reality,. This argument, which is an argument for priority monism by way of principles of modality, may be posed as follows:. The argument is obviously valid, so the only remaining questions concern the truth of the premises 14 and As to 14, the idea is that the direction of priority must be a necessary truth, at least with respect to all metaphysically possible worlds.
It would be odd if there were worlds that were otherwise indiscernible, save for differing over what was prior to what. The direction of priority seems to have the same status as other fundamental metaphysical claims e.
If the world is a text then these principles constitute its syntax. They specify the categories of basic constituents and the rules for their combination. That said, one might expect the priority pluralist to challenge 14, for one of the following two reasons. First, the priority pluralist might on considering gunk, and maintaining her thesis that the parts are prior to the whole declare that nothing is basic in gunky worlds. Things get ever more basic without limit.
This is no longer priority pluralism but priority nihilism, as least for gunky worlds. Second, the priority pluralist might on wanting to maintain basic entities in a gunky scenario, but not wanting to take the whole as basic take some intermediate level of mereological structure to be basic. But this is hardly thematic for the pluralist, as now she would be treating these intermediate structures monistically, as prior to their parts.
In any case it seems arbitrary, especially in cases where there is no natural joint in the gunk. For instance, in the case of a homogeneously pink cube of gunk, all the levels of mereological structure save for the top are intermediate, and all are homogeneously pink. Is there supposed to be a fact of the matter as to which intermediate level is really basic? Turning to 15, there seem to be good reason for accepting gunky possibilities.
The best tests for whether a scenario is possible are whether it is conceivable, logically consistent, and posited in serious scientific theories. Gunk passes every test Schaffer It is conceivable. For instance, it is conceivable that everything is extended, and that everything that is extended has two extended halves.
This generates a Zeno sequence of halvings without limit. Further, gunk is logically consistent. Or at least, there are gunky models of classical mereology Simons Finally, gunk is scientifically serious. Here we enter into deep issues concerning the extent of what is possible. In this vein Bohn argues that junk has an equal claim to gunk for being metaphysically possible.
But the priority monist can point to some crucial differences between gunk and junk that arguably justify only recognizing the metaphysical possibility of the former.
Indeed it is doubtful that junk passes any of the tests for possibility that gunk passes. As to conceivability, it is hard to conceive that there is no limit to summation at which one has taken in everything. As to logical consistency, as least if this is judged with respect to classical mereology arguably our best systematization of the logic of part-whole relations, and certainly the most orthodox , there is a difference as well: classical mereology has gunky models but not junky models.
The onus is on the defender of junk to produce an overall logic of part-whole relations which tolerates junky models while being as plausible as orthodox classical mereology. A fourth argument to consider is the argument from heterogeneity.
This argument, which is an argument for priority pluralism, may be posed as follows:. The argument is obviously valid, so the only remaining questions concern the truth of the premises 17— The truth of 19 is perhaps evident. There is qualitative variation in the world. Things are not uniform in all directions. The world is in fact not the kind of perfectly homogeneous sphere that Parmenides quoted in Robinson imagined it to be:.
But since there is a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the body of a well-rounded sphere, evenly balanced in every direction from the middle; for it cannot be any greater or any less in one place than in another. So the question is whether priority monism can account for the qualitative heterogeneity of the cosmos. Further, 18 follows from So the real question comes down to the status of Why think that fundamental entities must be homogeneous as per 17?
Here are the best two related attempts one might make at defending First attempt : nothing can differ from itself. For a fundamental entity to be heterogeneous would be for it to be internally diverse, which would render it different from itself.
The pluralist has many fundamental entities, which may all be homogeneous, but might still be different from each other. Hence if the only way to account for heterogeneity were to have many fundamental homogeneous parts differing from each other, then the priority pluralist would have the only way to account for heterogeneity. Perhaps this line of thought is behind the following passage from Turner :.
The weak point of all metaphysical Monism is its inability to explain how, if there is but one reality, and everything else is only apparent there can be any real changes in the world, or real relations among things. Having made an attempt to defend 17, it is time to turn to replies on behalf of the priority monist. The starting reply is that internal heterogeneity within the basic must be allowed by everyone. For there might be heterogeneity all the way down , in the sense of matter every part of which has heterogeneous proper parts.
In a partially similar vein, Taylor 88 claims that the pluralist can gain no advantage:. It must be possible to account for heterogeneity in other ways. It remains to describe these ways. The claim that the world is polka-dotted is a coherent claim, which would entail heterogeneity among its derivative dots and background. The second way to allow for heterogeneity without contradiction is to relationalize properties. Here the idea for monadic properties at least is that instantiation is a three-place relation holding between an object, a property, and a region.
So the world might be heterogeneous by, for instance, instantiating red here and green there. The third way to allow for heterogeneity without contradiction is to regionalize instantiation. Here the idea is that, instead of regionalizing the properties, one might regionalize the instantiation relation itself. So the world might be heterogeneous by, for instance, instantiating-here red and instantiating-there green.
Perhaps there is a better way to defend 17, and perhaps there are problems with all three of the monistic strategies that have been sketched distributional properties, relationalized properties, and regionalized instantiations.
This takes us deeper into issues about objects and properties. The argument is evidently valid, so the only remaining questions concern the truth of the premises 21— The priority monist could in principle try to contest 21, but the notion of an intrinsic property looks to have important theoretical work to do.
If one wants to say that some subcosmic objects are duplicates and some not, or say that some subcosmic objects undergo change and some do not, then it seems that one needs to posit a real difference between the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of subcosmic objects. It seems to me that the priority monist should hope to capture this plausible distinction rather than erase it.
It would be a cost to sever this connection. Though it may be that all parties will need to sever this connection in the end: for instance, if priority relations themselves are fundamental, then there will be nonfundamental objects in fundamental relations.
So it seems to me that most of the action should be on 22, which essentially encodes a certain conception of intrinsicness defended in different forms by Lewis , Sider , and Rosen , which seems to build in some sort of preconceptions of fundamentality for the parts and dependence on the parts.
Thus Lewis 61 says:. She might also—following Sider—make the more modest case that these are the best definitions going. The priority monist should ideally reply by giving a successful definition of intrinsicness that is compatible with her view. Perhaps the notion—or some allied notion such as duplication—must in the end be taken as primitive. Pending a successful definition, the priority monist may still play defense in two main and connected ways.
Secondly, she may turn the tables, and—following Trogdon —maintain that any conflict between priority monism and a proposed definition of intrinsicness reflects badly on the proposed definition of intrinsicness. That said, it is perhaps fair to acknowledge some advantage to the priority pluralist at this stage of the discussion on intrinsicness, insofar as her view fits with certain at least partially plausible attempts to define intrinsicness, and insofar as it is not yet know whether the priority monist can make the same claim.
A sixth argument to consider—drawn in part from Schaffer b—is the argument from free recombination. This argument, which may potentially be run in favor of either priority pluralism or priority monism, begins with the idea that priority pluralism is connected to the modal claim of free recombination.
Any way the one can be and any way the other can be ought to be compossible. A disconnected pluralistic heap thus should be amenable to free recombination, and thus failure of free recombination is the modal signature of an interconnected monistic cosmos. The argument from free recombination thus begins with:.
Given 25, the priority pluralist may try to argue from the right bijunct to priority pluralism, and the priority monist may try to argue from the denial of the right bijunct to the denial of priority pluralism which still leaves open priority nihilism, but at least eliminates the more popular competitor. So the argument continues:. Obviously the priority pluralist who runs this argument will run 26 and 27 as stated, while the monist or nihilist will run their parenthetical variants.
The argument—in whichever direction it is run—is evidently valid, so it remains to consider the premises. There are two main reasons why one might challenge First, one might challenge the left-to-right direction of 25 from priority pluralism to free recombination by holding that free recombination is independently blocked.
Obviously here one enters into deeper issues concerning modality, and the extent to which brute necessary connections are or are not tolerable. A second reason why one might challenge 25 is a challenge to the right-to-left direction from free recombination to priority pluralism. While priority pluralism arguably entails free recombination, it is not obvious that priority monism should entail any lack of free recombination.
Just because multiple concreta have a common ground in the cosmos does not mean that these concreta cannot be freely recombined. Perhaps modal constraint entails ontological connection; but it is not obvious why ontological connection should entail modal constraint.
If so then the priority monist might have a special flexibility with respect to whether or not there is free recombination. But it is likely that most of the action will fall on First, there is the package of pluralism plus modal freedom between these multiple units of being.
Secondly, there is the package of pluralism plus brute necessary connections in nature. Thirdly, there is the package of priority monism without modal freedom between multiple concreta. This monistic option may allow one to combine a rejection of brute necessary connections in nature with an absence of free recombination. The argument from combinatorial constraints may be connected to the classic monistic argument from the internal relatedness of all things Schaffer b.
A strong notion of internal relatedness is one on which two entities are internally related if and only if neither can exist without the other necessarily, either both exist or neither exist. The idea of combinatorial constraints may be seen as a useful weakening of this strong notion of internal relatedness.
So understood, to claim that all things are internally related just is to claim that there are combinational constraints between all things, and the inference from the internal relatedness of all things to priority monism just is the inference from combinatorial constraints to a holistic common ground, which accounts for the constraints. A seventh argument to consider—drawn from Schaffer —is the argument from nomic integrity. This argument notes that the world is a single integrated causal system, and uses that observation to argue for priority monism as follows:.
As Ellis says:. The priority pluralist or nihilist could deny 29, but 29 seems to fit a fairly standard image in philosophy of science. Thus Maudlin writes:. One way to support this idea is to note that nomic evolutions concern the behavior of closed systems , and only the universe as a whole forms a closed system. Rather the priority pluralist or nihilist is more likely to deny 28, and say that it is too demanding a standard for basicness.
In this vein, Miller responds by allowing that it is a necessary condition on a plurality being the plurality of basic objects that they plurally evolve by the fundamental laws, but adding that further constraints on fundamentality can also come in to filter out bad pluralities such as the plurality of each left foot, plus the rest of the cosmos minus the fusion of all the left feet.
Tack on the premise that if priority monism is true then it is necessarily true, and it follows that priority monism is false. The main options for the priority monist seem to be denying the modalized version of 28 Schaffer 84 , and so claiming that priority monism holds even at island universes; or denying the final premise that if priority monism is true then it is necessarily true, and instead claiming that the matter is contingent Siegel But whatever option the priority monist should take, it is hard to see how an argument premised on the claim that it is necessary that basic objects evolve by the fundamental laws, could refute priority monism in the end, given the claim in 29 that the cosmos is the one and only thing which actually evolves by the fundamental laws.
That much at least gets us the actual truth of priority monism. There are further arguments to consider against priority monism, which use modal cut and paste principles to either paste our cosmos into a bigger world, or cut parts of our cosmos to make a smaller world. Here is a way to run the pasting argument :.
The priority monist could deny 31, but that presumably means abandoning the argument from gunk in particular thesis The priority monist could also deny 33 but that seems desperate. Lusthaus, Dan. London: Routledge Curzon, Moran, Dermot. Phillips, Stephen H. Ruse, Michael.
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